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The empirical evidence currently available in the literature regarding the effects of a country's 
IMF program participation on its output growth is rather mixed. To shed new evidence on this 
issue, in this paper we specify a state-dependent panel data model accounting in particular for 
program participation selection and the potential conditionality of the output growth effects of 
program participation on a country's degree of program implementation and institutional 
factors such as quality of governance, internal stability, health, and educational attainment. 
We find that the effects of IMF program participation on output growth vary systematically 
with the degree of program implementation as well as our index of institutional factors, and 
that these effects are positive only if the IMF program is implemented to a sufficient degree or 
if the program participation is coupled with sufficient progress in improving institutional 
quality. 
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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) began its operations in 1945, and
was conceived as an independent international organization helping to pro-
mote macroeconomic and nancial stability as well as growth of the world
economy. In the 1970s the IMF expanded its role towards providing on a
conditional basis development assistance to countries that as a prerequisite
for loan approval had to initiate economic and structural reforms as out-
lined by the IMF.1 While the IMF has often been criticized for failures in
carrying out such development policy, in the wake of the recent nancial
crisis a number of calls have been made for an expanded role of the IMF.
This paper re-considers the eects of a country's participation in IMF loan
programs on its output growth, taking account of conditionality of these
growth eects on the degree of program implementation as well as institu-
tional factors such as quality of governance, internal stability, health, and
educational attainment.
The IMF has been oering four types of loan arrangements involving
policy conditions, the stand-by arrangement (SBA), the extended fund fa-
cility (EFF), the structural adjustment facility (SAF), and the enhanced
structural adjustment facility (ESAF), subsequently replaced by the poverty
reduction and growth facility (PRGF). Most of the IMF's assistance is pro-
vided through SBAs. Designed in 1952 to help countries with addressing
short-term balance of payments problems, SBAs typically cover periods of
one to two years. The EFF was set up in 1974 to help countries encoun-
tering long-term balance of payments problems requiring fundamental eco-
nomic reforms. EFF loan arrangements usually cover three to ve years.
The SAF has been used since 1986, and is designed to provide assistance
for low-income countries. The ESAF only diers slightly from the SAF, but
involves stricter conditionality criteria and larger loan amounts. The ESAF
was used since 1986; after the East-Asian crisis this facility was relabeled
PRGF, as it was broadened to include poverty reduction and to grant gov-
ernments larger scope in negotiating the policy conditions. Typically PRGF
programs are pursued for up to four years. When conditionality is involved,
the IMF assesses whether a country complies with the conditionality re-
quirements; if so, the country can draw on the loan funds in pre-specied
1For a more detailed exposition, see Fritz-Krockow and Ramlogan (2007).
2intervals.2
The previous empirical evidence regarding the eects of a country's par-
ticipation in IMF loan programs on its output growth is rather mixed. Us-
ing political economy variables as instruments to address endogeneity issues,
Barro and Lee (2005) nd that the IMF loan program participation rate has
a negative eect on output growth.3 Vreeland (2003), using counterfactual
analysis, also nds evidence that program participation leads to a reduction
of output growth. In contrast, Dicks-Mireaux, Mecagni and Schadler (2000),
also using counterfactual analysis, nd positive output growth eects of IMF
program participation.
In this paper we provide new insights regarding the eects of a coun-
try's IMF program participation on its output growth by constructing and
estimating a state-dependent panel data model accounting in particular for
sample selection, for the endogeneity of program participation, and for the
potential conditionality of the output growth eects of IMF program partic-
ipation on a country's degree of program implementation and institutional
factors such as quality of governance, internal stability, health, and edu-
cational attainment. We argue that capturing sample selection, program
participation endogeneity, and state dependence of the eects is critical for
properly measuring the eects of a country's IMF program participation
on output growth. To cope with sample selection issues, we work with an
equation system composed both of a program participation selection and an
output growth (participation eects) equation; within this equation system,
we account for the endogeneity of the program participation measure in the
output growth equation using a two-step maximum likelihood estimator.
We capture country-specic eects under the two alternatives of a random
and a xed eects model. To account for the state dependence of the output
growth eects of IMF program participation, we use semi-parametric con-
ditional pooling techniques to condition the eects of participation in IMF
programs on a country's degree of program implementation and its institu-
2For the empirical work in this paper we will not discriminate between these dierent
loan arrangement schemes. While SBAs in contrast to the other schemes cover elements
of structural reforms only to a limited extent, for example in the form of exchange rate
and pricing policies, SBAs often precede one of the other schemes simply because \there
has not [...] been enough time to assemble all the necessary elements of a comprehensive
structural package" (Polak, 1991).
3Barro and Lee (2005) dene the loan participation rate as the fraction of months
during a ve-years interval that a country operated under IMF loan programs.
3tional features as measured by our index comprising measures of quality of
governance, internal stability, health, and educational attainment.
Using this novel econometric framework and a sample of annual data
for 86 countries over the time period from 1975 to 2005, we provide evi-
dence that the eects of IMF program participation on output growth vary
systematically with the degree of program implementation as well as our
index of institutional factors, and that these eects are positive only if IMF
program participation is at a suciently advanced stage, or if the program
participation is coupled with sucient progress in improving institutional
quality.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 pro-
vides a review of the previous literature. Sections 3 and 4 describe our
panel econometric framework, with Section 3 focussing on sample selection
and endogeneity issues, and Section 4 describing our approach to modelling
state dependence of the eects of IMF program participation. Section 5 de-
scribes the construction of our variables for modelling the state dependence
of the eects of IMF program participation on a country's output growth.
Section 6 presents our empirical results. Finally, Section 7 concludes. Fur-
ther details regarding our econometric modelling framework and inference
approach, further results checking on the robustness of our main ndings
and some details concerning the data set we collected for this paper are
described in several appendices.
2 Review of Previous Literature
There are a number of notable contributions to the literature concerned
with measuring the eects of a country's IMF loan program participation on
output growth. Most of the contributions can be characterized as following
one of three approaches: (i) the \before-after"-approach, (ii) the \with-
without"-approach, and (iii) regression-based approaches.4
The \before-after"-approach is based on the idea that, ceteris paribus,
output growth that a country has experienced before/after entering an IMF
loan program may be compared with output growth that the country experi-
ences during participation in an IMF loan program. For example, Evrensel
4See also Vreeland (2003) and Dreher (2006) for a similar categorization of the litera-
ture.
4(2002) investigates the eects of IMF loan programs for a sample of 109
countries over the time period from 1971 to 1997 using lags of up to three
years before and after program participation to conduct a \before-after"
analysis. With respect to the output growth eects of program participa-
tion, she argues that the evidence is inconclusive. The main problem with
the \before-after" approach, in any case, is that in practice it does not allow
to fully account for country-specic factors that have bearing on the output
growth eects of program participation.
The \with-without" approach rests on the assumption that the core fea-
tures of countries that participate in IMF loan programs are the same as
those of countries not participating in IMF loan programs. For example, us-
ing matching methods, Hutchison (2004) analyzes the dierences in output
growth between countries participating and those not participating in IMF
loan programs, for a panel of 25 countries over the time period 1975 to 1997.
Hutchison's (2004) results suggest that, once sample selection is controlled
for using observed variables only,5 participation in IMF loan programs has
no adverse eects on output growth. However, Hutchison's (2004) match-
ing methods do not take into account any selection based on unobserved
variables, and so his results may still be subject to sample selection bias.
Bordo and Schwartz (2000) compare the performance of 24 Asian and Latin-
American countries over the time period 1973 to 1999 and nd that before
the onset of currency or banking crises, output growth declines more strongly
in countries not participating in IMF loan programs, though not to levels
as low as of those countries participating in IMF loan programs. They nd
furthermore that countries not participating in IMF loan programs recover
faster after currency and banking crises.
The majority of contributions to the empirical literature on the eects
of IMF loan program participation on output growth employ regression-
based approaches. Dicks-Mireaux, Mecagni, and Schadler (2000) perform a
counterfactual analysis using a panel data set for 74 countries over the time
period from 1986 to 1991. Taking into account sample selection issues, they
nd signicant, positive eects of IMF loan program participation on output
growth. In contrast, Vreeland (2003) using a similar methodology for a panel
5See, for example, Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) for a distinction between
selection based on observed variables versus selection based on unobserved variables.
5of 79 countries over the time period from 1970 to 1990,6 nds a negative im-
pact of IMF program participation on output growth. Bordo and Schwartz
(2000), also using counterfactual analysis, nd negative but insignicant ef-
fects on output growth during the onset of a currency or banking crisis, but
positive and signicant eects a year later. Their data set comprises 24
Asian and Latin-American countries and covers the time period from 1973
to 1998. Hutchison and Noy (2003), distinguishing between IMF program
approval and successful completion of IMF programs, analyze the eects of
IMF program participation on output growth in a sample of 65 develop-
ing countries over the time period from 1975 to 1997. Using counterfactual
analysis, they nd that participation in IMF loan programs results in short-
run output growth losses, though noting that these results appear entirely
driven by the Latin-American countries in their sample. Finally, Barro and
Lee (2005), using a set of political economy variables as instruments to cor-
rect for regressor endogeneity problems in a panel comprising 86 countries
over the time period from 1975 to 2000 nd that participation in IMF loan
programs has a signicantly negative eect on output growth.
3 Panel Data Models with Sample Selection and
Censored Endogenous Variables
When using a regression framework to estimate the eects of IMF pro-
gram participation on a country's output growth, two issues that need to be
addressed are (i) endogeneity of the program participation measure in the
output growth equation and (ii) sample selection. The rst issue arises when
explaining output growth with, inter alia, a country's participation in IMF
loan programs, as one will need to distinguish whether a country's economic
performance is causal for IMF program participation, or vice versa. The
second issue arises when using non-randomly selected samples for model es-
timation, as then the fact that the output growth performance of countries
that participate in IMF programs may systematically dier from that of
those countries that do not participate needs to be addressed.7 Countries
tend to participate in IMF loan programs when they encounter economic
6Vreeland (2003) also uses a larger data set, ranging from 1950 to 1990.
7As is well known, the investigation of such sample selection eects was pioneered in
empirical microeconomics by Heckman (1979).
6problems, which implies that they are likely to experience an output growth
process that is dierent from that of countries that do not turn to the IMF
for assistance. It is thus sensible to analyze the output growth process of
participating countries { that are likely to be in a situation of economic crisis
{ separately from the output growth process of non-participating countries,
which in turn necessitates to correct for sample selection. As noted by Vella
(1998), while sample selection has in the literature been commonly con-
fronted in purely cross-sectional analyses, it is less frequently considered to
be of concern in the estimation of panel models. This may in part be due to
the perception that a panel model incorporating random or xed eects will
eliminate most forms of unobserved heterogeneity. However, consistency
of the xed eects estimator of a default xed eects model not explic-
itly capturing the selection mechanism requires that the selection operates
purely through the time-invariant country-specic terms, which appears to
be rather unlikely. Consistency of the random eects estimator of the de-
fault random eects panel model requires the additional condition that the
time-invariant country-specic eect and the model's disturbance term are
uncorrelated.
3.1 Random Eects Panel Model with Sample Selection and
Endogeneity
In the following we will rst outline a random eects model to correct for
sample selection as well as endogeneity of the IMF program participation
measure in the output growth equation. Our exposition of this random ef-
fects model draws strongly upon Vella (1998) and Vella and Verbeek (1999).8
Consider the following random eects panel data model with sample selec-
tion and endogeneity:
8Vella and Verbeek (1999) discuss a model that inter alia allows for a broader range
of functional forms than we wish to consider in this paper. Our model specication also
diers from theirs in that unlike Vella and Verbeek (1999) we wish to allow for a larger
number of regressors in the participation selection equation than in the participation
eects equation.
7y
it = i + dit +x x x0
it   + eit (1)
(\participation eects equation"),
d
it = i +z z z0













it if dit > 0;
\unspecied" otherwise,
(4)
i = 1;2;:::;N; and t = 1;2;:::;Ti, where y
it and d
it are latent endogenous
variables for country i and time period t with observed counterparts yit
(output growth { participation eects measure) and dit (IMF loan-quota
ratio { measure of participation intensity).9 Also note that x x xit is a subset
of z z zit, and throughout our exposition in this section z z zit will be taken to be
strictly exogenous.
Let us write the unobserved component of each equation as the sum of
the country-specic random eect (i in Equation (1) and i in Equation
(2)) and the time-specic idiosyncratic error term (eit in Equation (1) and
vit in Equation (2)):
it = i + eit; (5)
and
uit = i + it: (6)
Dening u u ui as the stacked (Ti  1) vector of uit's for country i, X X Xi =
9While the availability of data on output growth is per se not tied to a country partici-
pating in an IMF loan program (that is, dit  0), yit under non-participation is unobserved
from the perspective of the sample selection model equations in (1) and (2), in that it is
then driven by a dierent model of output growth.
8(x x xi1;x x xi2;:::;x x xiTi)0, and Z Z Zi = (z z zi1;z z zi2;:::;z z ziTi)0, we assume that
u u uijZ Z Zi
iid  N(0;2
    0 + 2
vI I I); (7)
with    being a Ti  1 vector of ones. Equation (7) restricts i and vit to be
independent across i, and vit is restricted to be intertemporally uncorrelated
and homoskedastic. We also assume that
E(itjZ Z Zi;u u ui) = 1uit + 2 ui; (8)
where  ui = T 1
i
PTi
t=1 uit, and 1 and 2 are parameters. Note that Equation
(8) allows for dit and it to be correlated, capturing endogeneity of the
IMF loan-quota ratio in the output growth equation as arising through the
program participation selection mechanism specied in Equation (2). Also,
through 2 6= 0 Equation (8) allows eit to be intertemporally correlated and
heteroskedastic.
Conditioning Equation (1) on the selection outcomes, d d di, as well as the
regressors in X X Xi, and observing Equation (8) yields
E(y
itjZ Z Zi;d d di) = dit +x x x0
it   + E(itjZ Z Zi;d d di)
= dit +x x x0
it   + 1uit + 2 ui: (9)
To obtain the sample selection correction terms in uit and  ui on the right-
hand side of Equation (9), Vella and Verbeek propose to compute
E[uitjZ Z Zi;d d di] =
Z
[i + E(vitjZ Z Zi;d d di;i)]f(ijZ Z Zi;d d di)di; (10)
where f(ijZ Z Zi;d d di) denotes the conditional density of i, and vit in terms
of its expectation conditional on Z Z Zi;d d di, and i is the generalized residual
from estimation of the panel Tobit model in Equation (2).10 The conditional
density of i can be obtained from
f(ijZ Z Zi;d d di) =
f(d d dijZ Z Zi;i)f(i)
f(d d dijZ Z Zi)
; (11)
10See Gourieroux, Monfort, Renault, and Trognon (1987) for a denition of the gener-
alized residuals we work with here.
9with f generically denoting density functions, and where
f(d d dijZ Z Zi) =
Z Ti Y
t=1
f(ditjZ Z Zi;i)f(i)di: (12)
After obtaining the conditional expectation of uit in Equation (10), the
output growth equation in (1) can be estimated, including uit and  ui as
additional variables to correct for sample selection while also allowing for
endogeneity of dit. The functional form of Equation (10) as well as de-
tails concerning the computation of the standard errors for the estimates of
;  ;1, and 2 can be found in Appendix A.
If eit is to be restricted to be intertemporally uncorrelated, then Equation
(8) reduces to
E(itjZ Z Zi;u u ui) = 1uit; (13)
implying that Equation (10) simplies to
E[uitjZ Z Zi;dit] =
Z
[i + E(vitjZ Z Zi;dit;i)]f(ijZ Z Zi;dit)di: (14)
3.2 Fixed Eects Panel Model with Sample Selection and
Endogeneity
Semykina and Wooldridge (2005) propose a xed eects specication of a
panel data model closely related to Equations (1) to (4). In what follows
we will invoke Semykina and Wooldridge's (2005) modelling of the xed
eects, decomposing the xed eects into a systematic component driven by
observables (the variables in g g gi) as well as a random unobserved component,
and then embed the resultant model within the estimation and inference
procedure discussed in Sub-Section 3.1.11
Following Semykina and Wooldridge (2005), let us thus invoke a Mundlak
(1978) type decomposition of the country-specic xed eect in Equation
11Semykina and Wooldridge (2005) provide a dierent two-step estimation and inference
procedure for a panel model with a Probit specication of the selection mechanism than
we propose in this sub-section for a panel model with a Tobit specication of the selection
mechanism. For our data set, the procedure we outline here appears to be more robust
to the selection of variables in g g gi than the Semykina and Wooldridge (2005) procedure.
A systematic comparison of our procedure with that of Semykina and Wooldridge (2005)
would be interesting to pursue but is beyond the scope of this paper.
10(2):
i =  +g g g0
i   + ri; (15)
where ri is a random eect; dening
~ uit = ri + vit; (16)
we assume in analogy to Equation (7) that
~ u u uijZ Z Zi;;g g gi
iid  N(0;2
r    0 + 2
vI I I): (17)
Note that the systematic component in i, g g gi, consists of cross-sectional
means over time, that is country-specic constants.
Clearly, the Mundlak (1978) and Semykina and Wooldridge (2005) xed
eects specication restricts the systematic variation of the country-specic
eect to only arise through the vector of observables g g gi. This is a more
restrictive specication of the xed eect than often adopted in other panel
data models, for example in the linear dynamic panel data literature.12
Let us use a similar decomposition as specied in Equation (15) for the
country-specic eect in the participation selection equation also for the
country-specic eect in the output growth (participation eects) equation
(that is, Equation (1)):
i =   +q q q0
i   + i; (18)
where i is a random eect and q q qi is a subset of g g gi; dening
~ it = i + eit; (19)
we now also assume in analogy to Equation (8) that
E(~ itjZ Z Zi; ~ u u ui; ;q q qi) = ~ 1~ uit + ~ 2 ~ ui: (20)
Note that g g g is a subset of q q q.
Under Equations (15) to (20), we therefore allow for a less restrictive
12See, for example, Binder, Hsiao, and Pesaran (2005) for an unrestricted formulation
of xed eects within a linear dynamic panel data model.
11specication of the country-specic eects than in Vella and Verbeek (1999),
and capture a xed eects specication in the spirit of Mundlak (1978) and
Semykina and Wooldridge (2005), augmenting both the program selection
equation, Equation (2), and the output growth equation, Equation (1), with
the regressors in q q qi and g g gi, but otherwise pursuing the estimation and infer-
ence procedure of Sub-Section 3.1. We will discuss the choice of elements in
q q qi in Section 6.
Finally, the null of the random eects specication of Sub-Section 3.1 can
be tested against the xed eects specication of this section by investigating
whether    = 0 0 0 and    = 0 0 0.
4 Conditioning the Eect of IMF Loan Program
Participation
The xed eects model of Section 3 still involves the restriction that the
systematic dierences in the output growth processes across participating
countries can be captured through the country-specic eects and dierent
realizations of the regressors in dit and x x xit. This is a rather strong assump-
tion. To analyze the eects of IMF program participation, it clearly seems
desirable to allow for systematic dierences in these eects themselves across
countries. To do so in a parsimonious form that also allows us to learn about
the sources of the variations of the eects across countries, we consider here
the conditional pooling (state dependence) approach of Binder and Oer-
manns (2008). This approach allows us to model the conditionality of the
growth eects of IMF loan programs on a country's degree of program imple-
mentation or on its institutional quality with a minimal set of assumptions
regarding the functional form of this conditionality. The approach consists
of modelling the state dependence with exible functional form polynomials,
as a (cross-sectionally) homogeneous function of the relevant conditioning
variable. Denoting the conditioning variable by wit and the exible func-
tional form polynomial by (wit), Binder and Oermanns (2008) propose to
specify (wit) using a parametric function of exible form, and in particular







with the Chebyshev polynomials cs(wit) recursively dened as cs+1(wit) =
2witcs(wit)   cs 1(wit), s = 1;2;:::;, c0(wit) = 1, c1(wit) = wit, and where

()
s , s = 0;1;:::;, are coecients that are homogeneous across countries.13
To condition an independent variable's eect, the variable may be mul-
tiplied with the Chebyshev polynomial (wit), and estimation can then be
carried out as usual with the resultant augmented set of variables.
5 Conditioning Variables
Under the conditional pooling approach (some of) the model coecients are
a function of a conditioning variable. According to the IMF, \[c]onditionality
refers to policies and actions that a borrowing member agrees to carry out as
a condition for the use of IMF resources. The purpose of conditionality is to
ensure assistance to members [...] in a manner that [...] establishes adequate
safeguards for the temporary use of the IMF's resources."14 In practice, the
IMF only disburses installments of funds agreed to in the loan program if
the country initiates specic reforms, that is, complies with conditionality of
the loan program. Hence, one way to model compliance with conditionality
is to consider the ratio of loans actually drawn relative to loans originally
agreed upon.15 Provided that the IMF consistently disburses funds only
to countries that are suciently successful in advancing economic reforms,
the loans-drawn-to-agreed ratio should be a useful proxy as to whether a
country is successful in implementing the economic reforms advocated by
the IMF.
We also consider a more direct measure of structural conditionality.
Structural conditionality according to the IMF since the 1980s has involved
changes in policy processes, legislation, and institutional reforms.16 In line
13Chebyshev polynomials belong to the class of orthogonal polynomials, and thus can
address collinearity problems that could arise under  > 1.
14See Fritz-Krockow and Ramlogan (2007), p. 25.
15This measure was initially suggested as a proxy for compliance with conditionality by
Killick (1995)
16See Nsouli, Atoyan, and Mourmouras (2006).
13with this, the IMF is arguing that \the implementation of IMF-supported
programs depends to a signicant extent on the domestic political and insti-
tutional environment".17 By fostering institutional development, the IMF
in eect acknowledges that ecient outcomes in market-oriented economies
are most likely to occur when the non-market institutions are functioning
well. Rodrik (2009) distinguishes between ve types of institutions that al-
low markets to perform well: (i) private property rights give enterpreneurs
the security of claiming the gains from investment and innovations; (ii) reg-
ulatory institutions prevent market failures that can arise from fraudulent
behavior and incomplete information; (iii) institutions for macroeconomic
stabilization are neccessary to alleviate shocks that hit the economy; (iv)
institutions for social security render a market economy compatible with
social coherence and stability; and (v) institutions of conict management
are neccessary to prevent social conicts from creating uncertainty and di-
version of ressources from economically productive activities. To capture a
broad range of aspects of institutional quality, we construct for this paper an
index incorporating measures of bureaucracy quality, absence of corruption,
law and order, government stability, absence of ethnic tensions and internal
conicts, and add two further dimensions by also taking account of health
(life expectancy) and educational attainment. The set up of the index is
described in what follows.18 The index is constructed on the basis of the
mean of the j-th country's index elements relative to the mean of the same
index elements for a base-country year (the United States in 2000):
indexit =
Pm
s=1 s-th variableit Pm
s=1 s-th variablebase-country, base-year
; (22)
where m denotes the number of variables that enter into the construction of
the index. To be able to calculate this index, we replace missing observations
using interpolated values. If for, say, country i a time series is missing
entirely, we proxy it via a \rank-matching" procedure: For each time period
for country i, rst a preliminary index is calculated on the basis of Equation
(22) involving only those variables that are actually available for country i.
We then also calculate the same preliminary index for all other countries
17See International Monetary Fund (2006).
18A listing including a description of all variables used for construction of our index is
given in Appendix B.
14for time period t, excluding those variables that are completely missing for
country i. Using these preliminary indices, we then calculate the period
t relative rank (that is, rankit
number of countriest) of the preliminary index value
of country i among the set of all countries that can be considered for the
preliminary index values in period t. We then proxy for time period t the
variable in country i that is entirely missing with the value of that variable
for which the period t relative rank is closest to the relative rank calculated
for country i's preliminary index for period t.
Finally, we impute those variables for which there are no observations
either at the beginning or at the end of the series backward or forward,
respectively, using the percentage changes of, again, a preliminary index that
contains only the variables that are available for the country in the missing
time period. At this point we then have for each country a balanced set of
variables that can be used to calculate the index as outlined in Equation
(22).
Our approach to index calculation ensures that there are no mean-shifts
in the index if for a country the time series for some variable begins later or
ends earlier than the time series for some other variables for that country.
Our approach furthermore preserves all the information about the variation
in the time series we exploit. It should be noted that due to the imputation
procedure it is possible that an index value may become larger than one.
6 Empirical Results
We begin by discussing empirical results obtained when taking into account
sample selection and regressor endogeneity by means of considering the xed
eects panel model without state dependence of eects, as outlined in Sub-
Section 3.1.19 The selection equation, Equation (2) is a xed eects Tobit
19The set of regressors for all equations was chosen on the basis of the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC). Since the AIC turned out to always select the xed eects specication,
in what follows we focus our discussion on the xed eects model. Potential candidates
for the Mundlak variables, gi and qi, were a country's fertility rate, freedom of the press,
freedom status of society, economic proximity to the U.S. and economic proximity to
major Europe. Results for the random eects specication are provided as robustness
check in Appendix D. Potential candidates for z z zit and x x xit were a country's cumulative
number of years in IMF loan programs, quota share at the IMF, sta share at the IMF,
political proximity to the U.S., political proximity to major Europe, reserve position,
current account position, trade openness, democracy index rating, investment share of
GDP, Government share of GDP, and ination.
15model, as the loan-quota ratio is left-censored at zero. It contains country
years with and without participation in IMF loan programs. Note that when
later we turn to considering state dependence of eects, the estimated models
involve dierent sets of observations than considered here, depending on the
conditioning variable chosen.20 Table 1 displays our estimation results when
estimating Equation (2), with the full set of observations available.



















Number of Years under IMF Programs 0:020
[4:358]
***
Mean Fertility Rate 0:556
[1:875]
*
Mean Economic Proximity to Major Europe  0:132
[2:032]
**
Number of Observations for the selection equation: 1640
Note: Estimation results are obtained by estimating Equation (2), augmented with the Mundlak variables
capturing xed eects. The dependent variable is the loan-quota ratio. The F-test of joint signicance of
the Mundlak variables is signicant at the 5% signicance level. t-statistics are displayed in square brackets
underneath the coecient estimates. A \*" indicates signicance at the 10% level, a \**" indicates signicance
at the 5% level and a \***" indicates signicance at the 1% level. The regression uses annual data, the sample
extends from 1975 to 2005 and the number of countries considered is 68. A description of all variables used is
provided in Appendix B.
As can be seen from Table 1, the estimated coecients on the invest-
ment share, ination, measure of democracy and mean economic proxim-
ity to Major Europe are signicantly negative. If the investment share or
the ination rate decline by one percentage point, then the ratio of IMF
lending to a country's quota increases by 1.686 or 0.027 percentage points,
20One of the conditioning variables, the (growth rate of the) index of institutional
quality, is available only for a sub-set of the observations in our sample. When using this
sub-set of observations the results of the selection equation do not change qualitatively,
however.
16respectively.21 If the measure for democracy increases by one basis point or
the mean economic proximity to Major Europe increases by one percentage
point, then the loan-quota ratio decreases by 3 or 0.132 percentage points,
respectively. The eect of a country's mean fertility rate and the number of
years a country has been under IMF loan programs are signicantly positive.
If the mean fertility rate increases by one percentage point or the number of
years under IMF loan programs increases by one year, then the loan-quota
ratio increases by 0.556 and 2 percentage points, respectively.
Figure 1 displays the marginal eects (red curve) of the signicant vari-
ables from Table 1 as well as the corresponding one-standard deviation
(green) and two-standard deviation (blue) bands.
The residual obtained from estimating the participation selection equa-
tion can be used to generate correction terms that, as described in Sub-
Section 3.1, in addition to correcting for sample selection also correct for
endogeneity when estimating the eects of changes in the loan-quota ratio
on the output growth of countries participating in IMF loan programs. Ta-
ble 2 displays our estimation results for the xed eects participation eects
model (without state dependence) of Sub-Section 3.1, using the growth rate
of real GDP per capita as the dependent variable and the IMF loan-quota
ratio,22 as well as a set of explanatory variables as independent variables.23
The estimated coecient on the investment share is signicantly positive.
An increase of the investment share by one percentage point increases a
21Note that dierentiating the latent variable (denoted here generically as y
) with
respect to the independent variable (denoted here generically as x, entering into the Tobit





The marginal eect for the observed dependent variable needs to be corrected for cen-
soring, multiplying  with the probability that the loan-quota ratio is strictly positive.
All reported eects are average marginal eects evaluated at the independent variables'
sample means.
22The IMF loan-quota ratio captures the average, on a monthly basis, of funds agreed
upon in all loan programs (SBA, EFF, SAF, ESAF/PRGF) divided by the country's quota
at the IMF. Note that Dreher (2006) only covers those arrangements that have been active
for at least ve months in a given calendar year. Our results do not change if we adjust
the loan-quota ratio accordingly. Similar to Vreeland (2003), we consider consecutive
agreements with the IMF as part of the same spell, since governments most of the time
have several consecutive agreements with the IMF. A description of all variables used is
provided in Appendix B.
23All standard errors reported in the following tables are corrected for rst-step sampling
uncertainty aecting second-step inference. See also Appendix A.
17Figure 1: Marginal Eects for Participation Selection Equation
(a) Investment share (b) Ination
(c) Democracy (d) Number of years under IMF programs
(e) Mean fertility rate (f) Mean economic proximity to Major Europe
country's growth rate of real GDP per capita by 0:09 percentage points.
The coecients on ination and the mean of a country's fertility rate are
signicantly negative. An increase of ination by one percentage point and
an increase of the mean fertility rate by one unit lead to a decrease of the
real GDP per capita growth rate by 0:003 and 0:035 percentage points,
respectively.
Two further issues are worth noting: First, 1 (not displayed in the table)
is signicant at the 10% level, providing evidence for a sample selection
mechanism. Second, the coecient on the loan-quota ratio is positive but
not signicant.24
24When estimating the participation eects equation without the sample selection cor-













Mean Fertility Rate  0:035
[2:315]
**
Number of Observations: 849
Note: Estimation results are obtained by estimating Equation (1), augmented with the Mundlak variables to
capture xed eects. The F-test of joint signicance of the correction terms, 1 and 2, is not signicant,
but 1 is individually signicant at the 10% signicance level, indicating correlation between the idiosyncratic
error terms. The dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth. t-statistics are displayed in square
brackets underneath the coecient estimates. A \*" indicates signicance at the 5% level and a \**" indicates
signicance at the 1% level. The regression uses annual data, the sample extends from 1975 to 2005 and the
number of countries considered is 68. A description of all variables used is provided in Appendix B.
To address the issue of heterogeneity bias in the loan program partici-
pation eects estimates when state dependence of the eects is ignored, in
our next step of analysis we condition the eects of the loan-quota ratio
on output growth on the amount-drawn-to-amount-agreed ratio, which, as
discussed in Section 5, may serve as a useful proxy for measuring state de-
pendence of eects. Taking into account such state dependence may also on
its own contribute to alleviating the endogeneity problem: One may expect
that a higher degree of compliance with conditionality causes higher (lower)
output growth if the reforms implemented promote higher (lower) output
growth. However, output growth should have a negligable eect on compli-
ance with conditionality. It appears sensible to conjecture that lower output
growth raises a country's willingness to accept painful economic reforms. In
this case, lower output growth should be associated with a higher degree
of compliance. In any case, the amount-drawn-to-amount-agreed ratio and
real GDP per capita growth in our data set feature a correlation of -0.05
only.
Table 3 provides our estimation results when using Chebyshev polynomi-
rection terms (which we can do for a total of 938 observations), then the coecient on the
loan-quota ratio has negative sign ( 0:003), with a t-statistic of  1:522.
19als of order one and the amount-drawn-to-amount-agreed ratio as capturing
state dependence.
















Mean of Fertility Rate  0:045
[3:144]
***
Number of Observations: 849
Note: Estimation results are obtained by estimating Equation (1), augmented with the Mundlak variables to
capture xed eects. The F-test of joint signicance of the correction terms, 1 and 2, is not signicant,
but 1 is individually signicant at the 10% signicance level, indicating correlation between the idiosyncratic
error terms. The conditioning variable, amount-drawn-to-agreed-ratio, has been used as control variable (not
displayed) and is not signicant. The dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth. t-statistics are
displayed in square brackets underneath the coecient estimates. A \*" indicates signicance at the 10% level,
a \**" indicates signicance at the 5% level and a \***" indicates signicance at the 1% level. The regression
uses annual data, the sample extends from 1974 to 2005 and the number of countries considered is 68. A
description of all variables used is provided in Appendix B.
Conditioning the output growth eects of the loan-quota ratio on the
proxy for compliance with conditionality has a considerable eect on the
estimation results: If a participating country were not to comply with con-
ditionality at all, the eect of loan program participation on output growth
is negative. An increase in the loan-quota ratio by 1 percentage point low-
ers the growth rate of real GDP per capita by 0.005 percentage points. (If
such a country does not receive any funds from the IMF, because it does
not set in eect the required reforms, the output growth eect obviously
would be zero.) However, the higher the compliance ratio, the smaller in
absolute terms the negative output growth eect of the loan-quota ratio.
If the compliance ratio is larger than 42%, then the eect of IMF program
participation turns positive.25 If all funds originally agreed upon are drawn,
25Note that this ratio is sizeably smaller than in Killick (1995), who sets a threshold
value for successful IMF program implementation at 80%, arguing that this cut-o point
20Figure 2: Eect of IMF Loan Size Conditional on Actual Degree of Program
Implementation, Annual Data, 1975 - 2005, 68 Countries.
that is, there is full compliance with IMF conditionality, then an increase of
the loan-quota ratio by 1 percentage point leads to an increase of real GDP
per capita growth by 0.007 percentage points. These results are in line with
IMF arguments stressing that compliance with conditionality is important
for the success of IMF loan programs. Figure 2 plots the coecient on the
loan-quota ratio conditional on the amount-drawn-to-amount-agreed-ratio
(red curve) with the one standard deviation (green) and two standard de-
viation (blue) bands. The eect of the IMF loan-quota ratio at a 10% level
turns signicantly positive from an amount-drawn-to-amount-agreed ratio
of 0.73 upwards.
To provide a dierent measure of quantication of the output growth
eects of IMF loan programs, Table 4 displays the average contribution of
the various regressors to a country's real GDP per capita growth net of
individual-specic eects, as implied by the state-dependent panel model in
Table 3:
is closely associated with successful program implementation based on a survey between
1980 and 1992.
21Table 4: Growth Accounting, Annual Data, 1975 - 2005, 73 Countries.
Variables Mean Eect Contrib. in %
Loan-Quota Ratio  0.005  30.39
Loan-Quota Ratio * Drawn Ratio 0.006 37.88
Investment Share 0.008 49.98
Ination  0.001   7.94
Reserves 0.006 36.70
Current Account 0.002 13.78
Sum 0.015 100.00
The overall contribution of the loan-quota ratio to real GDP per capita
growth net of individual-specic eects is equal to 7:49%. The investment
share contributes most to a participating country's real GDP per capita
growth, at almost 50% .
To investigate the state dependence of the output growth eects of IMF
program participation on a country's institutional quality directly, we next
use our index of institutional quality as described in Section 5. Since struc-
tural conditionality is measured in changes by the IMF, we include the index
of institutional quality in percentage changes (\institutional development")
as our conditioning variable.
Table 5 displays results when using Chebyshev polynomials of order one
and institutional development as the conditioning variable.
Conditioning the eect of the loan-quota ratio on institutional develop-
ment yields signicant results: If a country cannot improve its institutional
quality, the eect of program participation on output growth is negative:
An increase of the loan-quota ratio by 1 percentage point lowers the growth
rate of real GDP per capita by 0.004 percentage points. At the same time,
the estimated coecient increases systematically with the magnitude of in-
stitutional development. Figure 3 displays the coecient on the loan-quota
ratio conditional on the progress in institutional development. If the insti-
tutional development progress exceeds 0.12, the eect of IMF loan program
participation on output growth turns signicantly positive at the 5% level.
Table 6 displays the average contribution of the various regressors to a
country's real GDP per capita growth net of individual-specic eects, as
implied by the state-dependent panel model in Table 5.
Having analyzed the eect of a country's participation in IMF loan pro-














Mean Fertility Rate  0:038
[2:070]
**
Number of Observations: 773
Note: Estimation results are obtained by estimating Equation (1), augmented with the Mundlak variables to
capture xed eects. The F-test of joint signicance of the correction terms, 1 and 2, is not signicant. The
conditioning variable, institutional development, has also been considered as a control variable (not displayed)
and is not signicant. The dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth. t-statistics are displayed in
square brackets underneath the coecient estimates. A \*" indicates signicance at the 10% level, a \**"
indicates signicance at the 5% level and a \***" indicates signicance at the 1% level. The regression uses
annual data, the sample extends from 1975 to 2005 and the number of countries considered is 60. A description
of all variables used is provided in Appendix B.
grams on its output growth, we next turn our focus to analyses of coun-
terfactuals and intertemporal eects involving IMF loan programs. To get
an idea about the magnitude of the eect of IMF program participation on
countries' output growth, Tables 7 and 8 display counterfactual analyses for
the panel models reported in Tables 3 and 5.
Table 7 reports that during participation in IMF loan programs countries
between 1975 and 2005 had on average a real GDP per capita growth rate
of 0:56%. The predicted value of this growth rate using the coecients from
the sample estimated only with country years under participation equals this
Table 6: Growth Accounting, Annual Data, 1975 - 2005, 65 Countries
Variables Mean Eect Contrib. in %
Loan-Quota Ratio 0.004 19.89
Loan-Quota Ratio * Instit. Dev. 0.001 2.33
Investment Share 0.007 35.11
Ination  0.001   6.06
Democracy 0.010 48.73
Sum 0.021 100.00
23Figure 3: Coecient of Loan-Quota Ratio Conditioned on a Country's
Progress in Institutional Development, Annual Data, 1975 - 2005, 60 Coun-
tries.
Table 7: Counterfactual Analysis, 1975 - 2005, Participating and Non-
Participating Countries, Conditioning with the Amount-Drawn-to-Amount-
Agreed Ratio, FE Specication
Country years Actual a) Predictedb) Predictedc) Predictedd)
Particip. 0.56% 0.56% 0.45% 1.40%
Non-Particip. 1.63% | 2.03% 1.63%
a) Actual average growth.
b) Coecient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model specication involving
only country years with participation in IMF loan programs.
c) Coecient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model specication involving
only country years with participation in IMF loan programs. The independent variable loan-quota ratio is
always set to zero.
d) Coecient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model specication involving
only country years without participation in IMF loan programs.
24Table 8: Counterfactual Analysis, 1975 - 2005, Participating and Non-
Participating Countries, Conditioning with the Progress in Institutional De-
velopment, FE Specication
Country years Actual a) Predictedb) Predictedc) Predictedd)
Particip. 0.52% 0.52% 0.05% 1.43%
Non-Particip. 1.53% | 2.08% 1.53%
a) Actual average growth.
b) Coecient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model specication involving
only country years with participation in IMF loan programs.
c) Coecient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model specication involving
only country years with participation in IMF loan programs. The independent variable loan-quota ratio is
always set to zero.
d) Coecient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model specication involving
only country years without participation in IMF loan programs.
0:56%, while the tted value using the same coecients, but counterfactually
setting the loan-quota ratio to zero, amounts to 0:45%. The predicted value
using the coecients from the sample estimated only with country years not
under participation amounts to 1:40%. Non-participating countries actually
had on average a real per capita GDP growth of 1:63%. The predicted
value using the coecients from the sample estimated only with country
years not under participation amounts to 1:63% while the tted value using
the coecients from the sample estimated only with countryyears under
participation, but counterfactually setting the loan-quota ratio always to
zero, amounts to 2:03%.
Three points are worth highlighting here. First, the second column of
Table 7 highlights the fact that country years under IMF loan participation
are times of (economic) crises. On average, countries had much lower output
growth during years of participation in IMF loan programs. For this reason,
it is imperative to properly capture the direction of causation in growth
regressions involving development aid. Second, countries in economic crisis
are, on average, better o when turning to the IMF and participating in
IMF loan programs. The annual percentage gain amounts to 0:11% real per
capita GDP growth per year. Nevertheless, as our results make clear, it is
important for a country to comply with conditionality and improve upon
its institutional quality. Third, according to our counterfactuals, countries
that participated in IMF loan programs would have had an average growth
25rate of 1:40% had they not participated. This number is almost three times
as high as their actual average growth rate, and thus seems rather unreal-
istic. Our counterfactuals thus appear to provide evidence in favor of the
presumption underlying our estimation strategy that countries entering IMF
loan programs in times of crises have fundamentally dierent growth regimes
than those countries that do not.
To learn more about the dynamic eects of IMF loan-program partic-
ipation on a country's output growth, we nally turn to estimating the
country's growth rates between t 1 and t 1+i, i = 1;2;:::;5, that can be
attributed to IMF loan participation in year t.26 Figures 4 and 5 display the
intertemporal eects when taking the optimal specication of the xed ef-
fects model with the amount-drawn-to-amount-agreed ratio or the progress
in institutional development as conditioning state variable, respectively.
Figure 4: Intertemporal Eect of the Loan-Quota Ratio on a Country's
Output Growth in the FE Model with Amount-Drawn-to-Amount-Agreed
Ratio as Conditioning Variable.
Tables 9 and 10 display the corresponding coecients and their signi-
cance levels for all time periods.
The output growth eects of participation in IMF loan programs are
signicant for up to three years after participation in an IMF loan program.
For all time periods the output growth eects of participation in IMF loan
26Note that it is not yet possible to use a dynamic model structure, in particular in the
growth equation, in our sample selection model.
26Figure 5: Intertemporal Eect of the Loan-Quota Ratio on a Country's
Output Growth in the FE Model with Progress of Institutional Development
as Conditioning Variable.
Table 9: Coecients of the Loan-Quota Ratio in the FE Model in an In-
tertemporal Perspective with the Amount-Drawn-to-Amount-Agreed Ratio
as Conditioning Variable



































Note: T-statistics are displayed in square brackets. A \*" indicates signicance at the 10% level and a \**"
indicates signicance at the 5% level.
27Table 10: Coecients of the Loan-Quota Ratio in the FE Model in an
Intertemporal Perspective with the Progress in Institutional Development
as Conditioning Variable

































Note: T-statistics are displayed in square brackets. A \*" indicates signicance at the 10% level and a \**"
indicates signicance at the 5% level.
programs are more favorable if a country complies with conditionality /
improves on institutional development.
7 Conclusion
Through modelling conditionality of the output growth eects of IMF pro-
gram participation, in this paper we have shed light on what appears to be
a major reason as to why previous empirical studies have arrived at mixed
results, ranging from positive output growth eects to no eects to nega-
tive eects from IMF program participation. Allowing the eects of IMF
program participation to vary systematically with the degree of program
implementation or an index of institutional development, we nd that there
are signicant positive eects of IMF program participation on a country's
output growth only if the IMF programs are implemented to a sucient
degree or if the program participation is coupled with sucient progress in
improving institutional quality.
With regards to the magnitude of these output growth eects, our growth
accounting calculations provide evidence that IMF loans have a sizeable
impact. Their output growth eect, in absolute size, is larger than that
of ination, for example, though much smaller than that of investment in
physical capital.
Our counterfactual analysis provides evidence that countries participat-
28ing in IMF loan programs would on average have had lower output growth,
had they not participated in IMF loan programs. The higher the degree
of program implementation and improvement in institutional quality, the
higher the potential gains from participating in IMF loan programs. We also
nd that output growth eects of IMF program participation are signicant
for up to three years after program participation, and are signicantly pos-
itive if participating countries comply with conditionality. Countries that
decide to turn to the IMF for funding appear well advised to comply with
IMF conditionality and to make every eort in improving their institutional
environment.
29Appendix A: Computation of Conditional Expecta-
tions and of Standard Errors
In this appendix we rst discuss the computation of the conditional expec-
tation in Equation (10) needed to correct the output growth equation, that
is Equation (1), under the random eects specication for sample selection
bias, while also allowing for endogeneity of dit.27 The conditional expec-
tation of vit given Z Z Zi;d d di, and i on the right hand side of Equation (2) is
calculated as follows:
E(vitjZ Z Zi;d d di;i) =

















where  and  denote the standard normal probability and cumulative den-
sity functions, respectively, and 1() denotes the indicator function.
Using this expression, the conditional expectation of uit given Z Z Zi and d d di,
Equation (10), can be obtained as:






















































When obtaining standard errors for the estimates of the parameters of
the output growth equation under the two-step procedure of Section 3, the
sampling uncertainty that has entered the construction of the correction
factors ^ uit and ^  ui needs to be observed. The following estimator of the
variance-covariance matrix of    = (   0 1 2)0 reects this sampling uncer-
tainty:
^ V arN =
1
N








^ G G G
 1
N ; (25)
27Note that the conditional expectation E(~ uitjZ Z Zi;d d di) arising under the xed eects
specication can be computed in analogous fashion, and thus need not be considered
separately.
30where ^ W W WN = ^ V arN(^   ),
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with
R R Ri =
 
d d di x x x0
i ^ u u ui ^  ui  

; (29)
   = (1 2)
0 ; (30)
and    is again a vector of ones of size Ti. Note that if 2 = 0 is imposed in
the estimation, then it appears sensible to also impose that ^ e e ei^ e e e0
i is a diagonal
matrix (reecting that eit is restricted to be intertemporally uncorrelated).
Computation of the standard errors of the growth equation parameter
estimates under the xed eects specication can proceed in analogy to
Equations (25) and (30).
31Appendix B: Description of Variables
Variables Source
Real GDP per capita: International Dollar in 2000 Constant Prices, thousand
dollars.
Penn World Tables 6.2
Openness in constant prices: Percentage in 2000 constant prices. Penn World Tables 6.2
Government share of real GDP: Percentage in 2000 Constant prices. Penn World Tables 6.2
Investment share of real GDP: Percentage in 2000 Constant prices. Penn World Tables 6.2
Total reserves in months of imports: Amount of reserves in terms of the
number of months of imports of goods and services which can be paid.
World Development Indi-
cators 2006 CD-ROM
Ination: Annual percentage change of the consumer price index. World Development Indi-
cators 2006 CD-ROM
Life expectancy at birth: Expresses the number of years a newborn can be
expected to live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth are
same throughout its life.
World Development Indi-
cators 2006 CD-ROM
Fertility rate: Number of children that are born to a woman if she lives to




Economic proximity to major Europe: Bilateral trade with major Europe,
expressed as a ratio to GDP.
Barro and Lee (2005)
Political proximity to major Europe: Fraction of UN votes along with major
Europe.
Barro and Lee (2005)
Democracy index: Based of the Legal Index of Electoral Competitiveness
(LIEC); Codied with 1 if it has a value of 6 or larger which is the threshold for
democratic systems.
World Bank Political Insti-
tutions Dataset
Quota: Countries' quota in millions of standard drawing rights (SDR). International Financial
Statistics
Loan-quota ratio: Sum of all current IMF loans a country is eligible to as a
share of its quota at the IMF.
International Financial
Statistics and own calcu-
lation
Amount-drawn-to-amount-agreed ratio: The amount of all IMF loan pro-
gram funds a country actually draws expressed as a share of the original amount
agreed upon with the IMF.
International Financial
Statistics and own calcu-
lations
Government Stability: Assesses the government's ability to carry out its de-
clared program(s), and its ability to stay in oce.
International Country
Risk Guide
Internal Conict: Assesses the political violence in the country and its actual
or potential impact on governance.
International Country
Risk Guide
Corruption: Assesses corruption within the political system. International Country
Risk Guide
Law and Order: Assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system as
well as the popular observance of the law.
International Country
Risk Guide
Ethnic Tensions: Assesses the degree of tension within a country attributable
to racial, nationality, or language divisions.
International Country
Risk Guide




Educational attainment: Total population aged 15 and over, average years of
school.
Worldbank
Institutional Index: Set up from the variables educational attainment, life ex-
pectancy, government stability, bureaucracy quality, corruption, law and order,
ethnic tensions and internal conict
International Country
Risk Guide and own
calculations
Freedom Status: Assesses political rights and civil liberties in a country. Freedom House
Freedom of the Press: Assesses the degree of freedom of the press in a country. Freedom House









Years with Program Partici-
pation
Algeria 1977:1991 1989:1991 Liberia 1979:1987 1979:1985
Argentina 1976:2004 1976:1978; 1983:2004 Madagascar 1975:2003 1977:1978; 1980:1992; 1996:2003
Australia 1975:2004 % Malawi 1981:2002 1981:1986; 1988:2002
Austria 1975:2004 % Malaysia 1975:2003 %
Bangladesh 1987:2003 1987:1993; 2003:2003 Mali 1989:2003 1989:2003
Belgium 1975:2001 % Mexico 1979:2004 1979:1979; 1983:1993; 1995:1997;
1999:2000
Bolivia 1976:2003 1980:1980; 1986:2003 Morocco 1975:2003 1980:1993
Botswana 1976:2003 % Mozambique 1988:2003 1988:2003
Brazil 1981:2003 1983:1986; 1988:1990; 1992:1993;
1998:2003
Namibia 2003:2003 %
Burkina Faso 1975:2001 1991:2001 Netherlands 1975:2004 %
Cameroon 1977:1995 1988:1992; 1994:1995 New Zealand 1975:2004 %
Canada 1975:2004 % Nicaragua 1977:2004 1979:1979; 1991:2004
Chile 1975:2004 1975:1976; 1983:1990 Niger 1975:2003 1983:1991; 1994:2003
Colombia 1975:2003 1999:2003 Nigeria 1977:2004 1987:1987; 1989:1992; 2000:2001
Congo, Rep. 1986:2003 1986:1988;1990:1992; 1994:1999 Norway 1975:2004 %
Costa Rica 1977:2004 1977:1977; 1980:1983; 1985:1997 Pakistan 1976:2004 1977:1978; 1980:1983; 1988:1991;
1993:2004
Cote d'Ivoire 1975:2003 1981:1992; 1994:2003 Panama 1977:2003 1977:1987; 1992:2002
Cyprus 1976:2004 1980:1981 Papua New
Guinea
1976:2001 1990:1992; 1995:1997; 2000:2001
Denmark 1975:2004 % Paraguay 1975:2003 2003:2003
Dominican Re-
public
1975:2003 1983:1986; 1991:1994; 2003:2003 Peru 1977:2003 1977:1980; 1982:1985; 1993:2003
Ecuador 1976:2004 1983:1992; 1994:1995; 2000:2001;
2003:2004
Philippines 1977:2004 1977:1981; 1983:2000
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1977:2003 1977:1981; 1987:1988; 1991:1998 Portugal 1976:2004 1977:1979; 1983:1985
El Salvador 1976:2003 1980:1983; 1990:2000 Senegal 1975:2003 1979:1992; 1994:2003
Finland 1975:2004 1975:1976 Sierra Leone 1977:2003 1977:1982; 1984:1989; 1994:1998;
2001:2003
France 1975:2004 % Singapore 1975:2004 %
Gambia, The 1978:1997 1978:1980; 1982:1991 South Africa 1975:2004 1976:1977; 1982:1983
Germany 1992:2004 % Spain 1975:2004 1978:1979
Ghana 1975:2003 1979:1979; 1983:1992; 1995:2003 Sri Lanka 1975:2003 1975:1975; 1977:1981; 1983:1984;
1988:1995; 2001:2003
Greece 1976:2004 % Sudan 1977:2003 1979:1985
Guatemala 1977:2003 1981:1984; 1988:1990; 1992:1994;
2002:2003
Sweden 1975:2004 %
Guinea-Bissau 1988:2003 1988:1990; 1995:1998; 2000:2003 Syrian Arab Rep. 1977:1988 %
Haiti 1975:2000 1975:1990; 1995:1999 Thailand 1975:2003 1978:1979; 1981:1983; 1985:1986;
1997:2000
Honduras 1975:2004 1979:1983; 1990:1997; 1999:2002;
2004:2004
Togo 1975:2003 1979:1998
India 1975:2003 1981:1984; 1991:1993 Trinidad and To-
bago
1975:2003 1989:1991
Indonesia 1981:2004 1997:2003 Tunisia 1984:2004 1986:1992
Ireland 1975:2004 % Turkey 1975:2004 1978:1985; 1994:1996; 1999:2004
Israel 1975:2004 1975:1977 Uganda 1981:2003 1981:1984; 1987:2003
Italy 1975:2004 1975:1975; 1977:1978 United Kingdom 1975:2004 1975:1978
Jamaica 1976:2003 1977:1996 United States 1975:2004 %
Japan 1977:2004 % Uruguay 1978:2004 1978:1987; 1990:1993; 1996:2004
Jordan 1975:2003 1989:1990; 1992:2003 Venezuela, RB 1975:2004 1989:1993; 1996:1997
Kenya 1975:2003 1975:1986; 1988:1994; 1996:2003 Zambia 1986:2000 1986:1987,1995:2000
Korea, Rep. 1976:2004 1976:1977; 1980:1987; 1997:2000 Zimbabwe 1980:1994 1981:1984; 1992:1994
28Major oil exporting countries, centrally planned and island economies have been ex-
cluded.
33Appendix D: Results for the Random Eects Panel
Model











Number of Years under IMF Programs 0:021
[7:562]
***
Stashare at IMF  0:029
[1:630]













Number of Observations for the selection equation: 2439
Note: Estimation results are obtained by estimating Equation (2). The dependent variable is the loan-quota
ratio. t-statistics are displayed in square brackets underneath the coecient estimates. A \*" indicates
signicance at the 10% level, a \**" indicates signicance at the 5% level and a \***" indicates signicance
at the 1% level. The regression uses annual data, the sample extends from 1975 to 2005 and the number of
countries considered is 73. A description of all variables used is provided in Appendix B.
34Figure 6: Eect of IMF Loan Size Conditional on Actual Degree of Program
Implementation, Annual Data, 1975 - 2005, 73 Countries.
Figure 7: Coecient of Loan-Quota Ratio Conditioned on a Country's
Progress in Institutional Development, Annual Data, 1975 - 2005, 65 Coun-
tries.
35Figure 8: Intertemporal Eect of the Loan-Quota Ratio on a Country's
Output Growth in the RE Model with Amount-Drawn-to-Amount-Agreed
Ratio as Conditioning Variable.
Figure 9: Intertemporal Eect of the Loan-Quota Ratio on a Country's Out-
put Growth in the RE Model with the Progress in Institutional Development
as Conditioning Variable.
















Number of Observations: 931
Note: Estimation results are obtained by estimating Equation (1). The F-test of joint signicance of the correc-
tion terms, 1 and 2, is not signicant, but 1 is individually signicant at the 10% signicance level, indicating
correlation between the idiosyncratic error terms. The conditioning variable, amount-drawn-to-agreed-ratio,
has been used as control variable also (not displayed), and is not signicant. The dependent variable is real
growth per capita GDP. t-statistics are displayed in square brackets underneath the coecient estimates. A
\*" indicates signicance at the 10% level, a \**" indicates signicance at the 5% level and a \***" indicates
signicance at the 1% level. The regression uses annual data, the sample extends from 1974 to 2005 and the
number of countries considered is 73. A description of all variables used is provided in Appendix B.
Table 14: Growth Accounting, Annual Data, 1975 - 2005, 73 Countries
Variables Mean Eect Contrib. in %
Loan-Quota Ratio  0.003  14.29
Loan-Quota Ratio * Drawn Ratio 0.005 21.91
Investment Share 0.015 71.32
Ination  0.001   5.59
Democracy 0.006 26.64
Sum 0.021 100.00

















Number of Observations: 852
Note: Estimation results are obtained by estimating Equation (1). The F-test of joint signicance of the
correction terms, 1 and 2, is not signicant. The conditioning variable, growth of the index of institutional
quality, has been used as control variable also (not displayed), and is not signicant. The dependent variable is
real GDP per capita growth. t-statistics are displayed in square brackets underneath the coecient estimates.
A \*" indicates signicance at the 10% level, a \**" indicates signicance at the 5% level and a \***" indicates
signicance at the 1% level. The regression uses annual data, the sample extends from 1975 to 2005 and the
number of countries considered is 65. A description of all variables used is provided in Appendix B.
Table 16: Growth Accounting, Annual Data, 1975 - 2005, 65 Countries
Variables Mean Eect Contrib. in %
Loan-Quota Ratio 0.004 12.21
Loan-Quota Ratio * Instit. Dev. 0.001 1.43




38Table 17: Counterfactual Analysis, 1975 - 2005, Participating and Non-
Participating Countries, Conditioning with the Amount Drawn to Amount
Agreed Ratio, RE Specication
Country years Actual a) Predictedb) Predictedc) Predictedd)
Particip. 0.61% 0.61% 0.44% 2.91%
Non-Particip. 2.09% | 2.18% 2.09%
a) Actual average growth.
b) Coecient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model specication involving
only country years with participation in IMF loan programs.
c) Coecient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model specication involving
only country years with participation in IMF loan programs. The independent variable loan-quota ratio is
always set to zero.
d) Coecient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model specication involving
only country years without participation in IMF loan programs.
Table 18: Counterfactual Analysis, 1975 - 2005, Participating and Non-
Participating Countries, Conditioning with the Progress in Institutional De-
velopment, RE Specication
Country years Actual a) Predictedb) Predictedc) Predictedd)
Particip. 0.57% 0.57% 0.13% 2.61%
Non-Particip. 2.06% | 2.27% 2.06%
a) Actual average growth.
b) Coecient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model specication involving
only country years with participation in IMF loan programs.
c) Coecient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model specication involving
only country years with participation in IMF loan programs. The independent variable loan-quota ratio is
always set to zero.
d) Coecient estimates used to compute the counterfactual are taken from the model specication involving
only country years without participation in IMF loan programs.
39Table 19: Coecients of the Loan-Quota Ratio in the RE Model in an In-
tertemporal Perspective with the Amount-Drawn-to-Amount-Agreed Ratio
as Conditioning Variable



































Note: T-statistics are displayed in square brackets. A \*" indicates signicance at the 10% level and a \**"
indicates signicance at the 5% level.
Table 20: Coecients of the Loan-Quota Ratio in the RE Model in an
Intertemporal Perspective with the Progress in Institutional Development
as Conditioning Variable
































Note: T-statistics are displayed in square brackets. A \*" indicates signicance at the 10% level and a \**"
indicates signicance at the 5% level.
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